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lt is paradoxical that the industrialised coun-
tries, most of which are not using their
production potential to the full, are hesitating
lo increase their financial aid to poor countries.
This is despite the fact that such aid could
result in increased global demand and thus
contribute to reactivation of world trade in a
recovery of production. There is nothing in the
present state of deflationary chain reactions in
the industrialised world, stagnation feeding
inflation, which would argue against such an
increase in financial aid.
This impressive call for action was given by no
less than M. de Larosière, Managing Director of
the IMF, speaking at UNCTAD V in Manila.
Since March, with no easing of stagflation in
spite of heavy doses of monetarist medicine in
many countries, the world economy has moved
closer to recession. Aid transfers are being
restrainedand sometimes cutand other finan-
cial flows are increasingly put in jeopardy by
fears of mounting debt.
In fact, a consensus resolution was reached on
these matters at UNCTAD V, in the committee
on the transfer of real resources. Amongst other
points, this stated that substantially increased
transfers of resources to developing countries are
an indispensable factor for accelerating their pace
of development and could help stimulate global
economic activity, particularly in a medium to
long-term perspective. The committee noted that
several approaches, including co-financing with
private resources, could usefully be combined in
order substantially to increase transfers of
resources, largely raised on the financial markets
and without prejudice to official development
assistance
Unfortunately it seems that this proposal is not
being given the serious attention it deserves in
spite of clear evidence of the size of the impact it
could make on levels of economic activity in both
developed and developing countries. Policy
makers and analysts are cautiousin part
through genuine uncertainties but in part, one
suspects, because interaction with developing
countries is still considered primarily a political!
diplomatic matter, not one of fundamental
importance for the health of the world economy
as a whole, let al9ne for the levels of employment,
economic activity and growth within the
developed countries themselves. Yet the facts
speak otherwise.
Over the last few years, a major recycling of
financial surpluses to developing countries has in
fact sustained economic activity in the developed
countries and held the line against further
deterioration in respect of unemployment, under-
utilisation of capacity and even inflation. The
EEC, for example, estimates that there would be
3 mn more unemployed if the non-oil developing
countries had cut their manufactured imports to
meet the increased oil prices of 1973-74 rather
than borrowing to maintain their level. By
borrowing, their purchasing power has risen to
account for 25 per cent of US exports and 20
per cent of EEC exports. As a result trade in
manufactured goods with the newly industrialising
countries alone has been found by the OECD to
have created an average net gain of 900,000 jobs
for the developed economies in each of the years
1973-77.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of this process
continuing is far from certain. The Community
Annual Economic Review 1978-79 summar-
ised the position as follows:
The present equilibrium of the world
economydepends to a considerable degree on
a continuing flow of private lending to the
non-oil producing developing countries (and to
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) on a scale
unheard of before 1974 and would be called in
question by any impediment to that flow.
(CEC 1978, section 8)
It is against this wider background that the world
economy is now being called upon to adjust to a
further increase in the price of oil. It is far from
clear that the same recycling mechanisms will be
able to operate for a further five years, starting as
they do this time with the structure of
international debt already considerably extended.
The total outstanding debt of developing countries
at the end of 1979 will already be some $300 bn
and current account deficits of non-oil
developing countries in this year alone are esti-
mated to reach a new peak of at least $50 bn.
This deficit could be met by increased exports
and/or increased financial transfersor it could
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lead to a reduced level of economic activity
and growth. Again we have an estimate based
on past experience. Holsen and Waelbroeck
(1976) estimated that balance of payments
borrowing by Ides in 1975 and 1976, to a value
of $8 bn and $11 bn respectively, prevented
a fall in their GNP by 5.0 and 6.9 per cent
in these two years, and thereby contributed
0.4 per cent and 0.6 per cent to the aggregate
demand sustaining the GNPs of the developed
countries. They added:
It is not usual in analysing business cycle
developments to think of developing countries
as capable of affecting aggregate demand. This
is because they are thought of as adjusting their
purchases passively to the level permitted by
their foreign exchange earnings. This
assumption is not correct any more. Less
develo ped countries' import policies influence
demand today in the same way as the US
deficit of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
the OPEC balance of payments surplus.
(Holsen and Waelbroeck 1976: 175)
Calculations made for UNCTAD by the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania using the LINK econo-
metric model of the world economy suggested that
an increase of the growth rate by three percent-
age points in the non-oil producing developing
countries would result in an increase of the
growth rate by one per cent in the OECD
countries (UNCTAD 1976). Since then, more
disaggregated analyses on alternative hypotheses
have been undertaken by various groups. The
results of the simulations undertaken by the US
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1978)
summarised in Table 1, make clear some of the
issues.
Table 1
Transfer of $20 bn per Year to Non-OPEC
Developing Regions, Maintained for Three Years
(per cent increase)
Source: US Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(1978: 3). The final two lines are calculated from
data given in later tables of the report.
These simulations consider a transfer of an
additional $20 bn a year to non-OPEC idcs
sustained for three years. Three ways of financing
the transfers were simulated: a) a 'costless' trans-
fer, analogous to transferring profits from the sale
of IMF reserves of gold or allocating newly
created SDRs to the ides. In essence, this
corresponds to a Keynesian stimulus to demand
which calls into use resources which would other-
wise be idle. The results shown in Table 1
correspond to these simulations. Exports and
imports in both developed and developing
countries would rise considerably. So also would
GNP: by roughly 0.5 per cent per year for three
years in the industrial countries; by 1+ per cent,
or slightly more, per year for those years in
non-OPEC Idcs. The employment impact of
such increases was not calculated but, following
Okun's rule of thumb, the increase in GNP might
be equivalent to a direct increase in employment
of perhaps 0.2 per cent or roughly 500,000 jobs
throughout the industrial countries.
The other two simulations are based on alter-
native ways of raising the finance: b) assumes
that the $20 bn is obtained by diverting govern-
ment expenditures from domestic goods and
services to the transfer programme in each of the
13 industrial countries. The sum involved is
roughly 1 per cent of GDP in these countries, so
the net effect is, also roughly, just over twice
that of increasing oda from the present average
level of 0.31 per cent of GNP in the DAC donor
countries to the target level of 0.7 per cent of
GNP. Simulation e) assumes that the $20 bn is
raised from additional direct taxation.
In both these simulations, the net impact on
both developed and developing countries is
substantially smaller than that of the first
simulation, essentially because the positive impact
of the transfers on economic activity in both
developed and developing countries is offset by
the negative impact of the withdrawal of effective
purchasing power in the industrial countries. In
the case of the transfer financed by a diversion
of government expenditures, the combined effect
on the GNP of the developed countries is
negative: total GNP with the programme would
be something under 0.1 per cent less than with-
out the transfer-though of course GNP in
developing countries would be 1.5 per cent higher.
In the case of the transfer financed by increasing
direct taxation, however, the impact on both
developed and developing countries would be
positive: for developed countries, an increase of
some 0.2 per cent of GNP, and for developing
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Effect on: Year of transfer:
First Second Third
World exports ($) 2.6 2.6 2.0
World exports (volume) 3.0 2.8 1.8
OECD exports ($) 3.1 3.1 2.3
OECD imports ($) 1.3 1.6 1.5
LDC exports ($) 1.4 1.7 1.4
LDC imports (S) 8.4 7.1 4.6
OECD GNP (real) 0.5 0.6 0.4
LDC GNP (real) 1.7 1.8 1.5
countries, about the same amount as in the other
simulations.
These simulations offer only a rough guide to the
possible effects of transfers of resources, but they
can help illuminate some of the issues, parti-
cularly the differential impact on the various
parties involved.
Structural Changethe Second Objective
Development, however, means much more than
a Keynesian expansion of demand. If a pro-
gramme of additional transfers is to stimulate
more balanced and sustainable growth in the
longer run, the transfers must be directed towards
adjustment, to deal with structural problems and
global imbalance in key sectors such as energy,
agriculture, certain sectors of industry and
certain, but not all, raw materials and commodi-
ties. Imbalances in all these sectors are consider-
able, and often the outcome of long term trends
which have been reinforced over the last few
years. It would help to make a start on
restructuring if these sectors in developing coun-
tries were made the focus for increased investment
under the transfer programme
In more general ways, a massive transfer of
resources could greatly assist restructuring. To
the extent that a higher level of economic activity
was stimulated in the industrialised countries,
unemployment would be reduced and thus also
one of the main factors which leads to popular
and political opposition to imports and restruc-
turing. The link between unemployment and
opposition to restructuring and adjustment is
worth stressing. More adjustment took place in
the 1 960s in most industrial countries than has
occurred in the last five years. Yet there was
relatively little opposition, a comforting contrast
with the present, usually attributed at least in
part to the lower unemployment and greater
economic dynamism of the 1960s.
Taken together, under-utilisation of capacity and
the need for restructuring provide the possibility
of, and suggest the need for a new international
initiative, under which a major increase in trans-
fers from developed to developing countries would
be combined with measures to stimulate invest-
ment in developing countries in projects or sectors
which would ease structural bottlenecks in the
medium and longer run. If they were on a reason-
able scale, the transfers and investment could
provide an important stimulus to higher levels of
economic activity in the industrial economies of
the Westthough their probable scale and timing
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suggest that any initiative should be judged
primarily for its medium term impact than for
its short-term countercyclical effects.'
Various policy instruments would be available to
implement such a programme of transfers: -
major increases in oda, especially but not only
from Germany and Japan, which currently
combine relatively low oda performance with
very large balance of payments surpluses;
additional flows of private finance, possibly stimu-
lated through new institutional mechanisms or
a major increase in co-financing; an increase in
SDRs, made possible by more ambitious reform
of the international monetary system; or a com-
bination of such instruments and measures, old
and new, but operated on a much larger scale
than at present and adding up to a coordinated,
identifiable international initiative.
In my view the critical points for such an
initiative to be politically acceptable and
economically effective are four. These are:
I) that the programme should combine
additional flows of private finance, with at
least some reasonable proportion of additional
oda. Without this, the poorer countries of the
Third World are likely to receive very little
benefit, and there will only be limited capacity
to stimulate additional investment in activities
which are important for development and
structural change, but which are only intrin-
sically or, at first, only marginally viable in
commercial terms, such as small scale agri-
culture, small scale transportation or even
energy exploration;
2) that the programme be clearly directed
towards stimulating investment of a sort which
promotes structural change internationally. The
particular sectors to be covered could be for
later discussionthough investment (and other
related supporting expenditure) to increase
Third World production in agriculture, energy,
and some sectors of industry and raw material
production and processing should certainly
qualify. So also would the support of any major
regional or global projects and programmes,
of the sort which have been proposed for the
Third Development Decade and the support of
international stockpiling schemes which might
form a part of international commodity
agreements;
1 Unless used for general balance of payments support it would
probably take several years to build up the programme of
investment to a sizeable scale. Moreover, estimates suggest
that no more than 70 per cent of the OECD multipler
effects would take place in the first year.
that responsibility for initiating the pro-
gramme and controlling its key operations
should clearly involve both developed and
developing countries on an equitable basis.
This is more important than the question of
where administrative responsibility for the
initiative would rest. As regards administration,
it would obviously be desirable to work through
existing institutions, if possible relying consider-
ably upon the regional development banks, as
a way of securing greater developing country
involvement and of strengthening the regional
focus;
that the initiative should be as substantial as
the situation justifies. A programme building
up within two to four years to total additional
flows of some $1 O-20 bn a year would not seem
excessive.
The number of voices, official and non-official,
calling for such a programme has been growing:
President Kreisky in 1976, Cheysson in 1977, the
Swedish proposal for a massive programme of
transfers in 1978. Over the last 18 months there
have been proposals from Nakajima for a Global
Infrastructure Investment Fund; from Senator
Javits for a $25 bn Growth Development Fund;
for an OPEC/OECD global stimulation plan and
for a 20-year Marshall Plan for the Third World.
The ICFTU Review of the World Economic
Situation states that there has been 'a growing
recognition over the past year of the need for a
massive, planned international effort to assist the
developing countriesfor a new, worldwide
"Marshall Plan", as advocated by the ICFTU for
some years'. (ICTFU 1978: 23.)
Mr. Roy Jenkins, giving the first Jean Monnet
Lecture in October last year, said:
We also need to view the present economic
recession in a longer-term perspective. The
extent and persistence of unemployment can
no longer be seen as an exceptionally low and
long bottom to the business cycle. To restore
full employment requires a new impulse on a
historic scale. We require a new driving force
comparable with the major rejuvenations of the
past two hundred years; the industrial revolu-
tion itself, the onset of the railway age, the
impact of Keynes, the need for post-war recon-
struction, the spread of what were previously
regarded as middle class standards to the mass
of the population in the industrial countries.
J believe that the needs of the Third World
have a major part to play here. Two sources
of new growth have in the past sometimes
come together, the one world-wide and the
other regional.
(Jenkins 1977: 9-10)
Yet in spite of these attempts to stimulate serious
action on these broad lines, most governments
of industrial countries have, to date, been
cautious and hesitant. Among the industrial
countries, caution has, I believe, been mainly the
result of three concerns: the fear of inflation;
the uncertainty of the impact on the balance of
payments of different countries; the reluctance to
consider any initiative which might involve
increasing public expenditure.
As indicated at Arusha and Manila, Third World
governments have been more open to such
proposalsbut not without conditions. Third
World responses have been particularly sensitive
to a strong emphasis on transferring resources in
ways which would support international structural
change, the inclusion of a component of oda in
order that poorer, as well as better-off, developing
countries may benefit from the initiative and a
broad base of control which will provide for
strong participation by developing countries in
the management of any such scheme.
The risk of inflation is in my view the most
legitimate of such objections. There is no strong
evidence to suggest that a stimulus to greater
economic activity within the industrial countries
would be less inflationary if effected by means of
a transfer to developing countries than by a direct
expansion of domestic demand. This has led some
critics to argue that a major transfer to
developing countries must be rejected for the
simple reason that industrial countries have
obviously been unwilling to undertake major
domestic programmes of Keynesian expansion.
In my view it is the general argument that almost
any expansion of demand, output and production
would be inflationary, that needs to be challenged.
The evidence for such a rigid view of a Phillips
curve relationship does not existand to base
policy on the belief that the higher the rate of
unemployment the lower will be the rate of
inflation, is both over-simplified and misleading.2
In contrast one can argue that continuing high
unemployment stimulates uncertainty and gene-
rates increasing reactions within the organised
section of the labour force and among companies
with monopolistic power in ways which may
result in greater, rather than less, wage-push,
2 See, for example, the comprehensive survey by Santomen
and Seaton (1978).
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cost-push and inflationary effects. Moreover,
these reactions often lead to institutional changes
which create further imperfections and rigidities
within both labour and other markets, thus
adding to inflationary tendencies and mechanisms,
built into the economic and social structure over
the longer run.
In contrast, clear evidence exists of the favour-
able effects of structural adjustment and trade
links with developing countries on inflation. The
1978 World Development Report showed that
textile prices over the past five years had risen
by 26 per cent compared with a general rise in
the wholesale price index of 66 per cent. A
recent Brookings study shows that imports from
less developed countries into the United States
sell at 16 per cent lower retail prices than
comparable domestically produced goods. The
OECD itself has recognised that trade with the
NICs has provided a 'curb to inflation' within the
industrial countries both in the short run and, by
encouraging increases in productivity and
efficiency, over the longer run.
Except for inflation, the other effects of the
programme are matters of policy, not inevita-
bility. The impact on the balance of payments of
different industrial countries, for example, will
primarily reflect how the size of each country's
'contribution' to the programme compares with
the amount of additional exports it gets from
the programme, which in turn will primarily
reflect the sectors and countries supported and
the institutional arrangements governing the use
of the transfer funds. All these are matters of
policy, which can be adjusted to match the goals
and constraints affecting the countries partici-
pating in the programme. So also is the form in
which the funds are raised and administered.
The need now is for one of the major govern-
ments of the industrial powers to give a strong
political lead: to recognise the need for a signifI-
cant international initiative along the lines pro-
posed and to provide the impetus and leadership
for it to be converted rapidly into a programme
for implementation. The ideas in general terms
have already been much debated, but over the
years not really engaged because strong political
leadership has been lacking. For a proposal now
to be seriously developed:
a time limit should be set for preparing a
specific programme;
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a clear mandate should be given for an inter-
national group or groups to work out the
elements of a feasible programme within clear
and broad basic guidelines, which recognise
the different interests of the various parties
involved;
for both North and South to be involved in
whatever formal meetings are required to
reach agreement on the proposal.
It is not argued that an initiative on these lines
would solve all the major economic problems of
the North or the South. In particular, special
attention would be needed if the mass of the
rural population in the poorer developing
countries were to gain much benefit. But a major
initiative for restructuring out of recession could
provide a more dynamic context in which other
long-standing problems could be tackled.
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